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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the effectiveness of Estonian labor market program which offers business 
subsidy for the registered unemployed. The outcomes of interest are gross income and gross 
income being positive; the maximum examined period after subsidy is 60 months, 2014 to 2019. 
The data on prior employment, unemployment and demographic indicators is used in the 
propensity score matching procedure and the outcome regression models. The results show 
positive effect of the subsidy on the probability to receive positive income in the first year after 
treatment and insignificant or negative effect afterwards. The effect on income is strictly negative 
almost immediately; however, there exist important data limitations which may have influenced 
the results. Sensitivity analysis has shown that the estimates are rather sensitive to hidden bias 
and the survival rate proxy indicates that most of the participants stayed employed at high-up 
positions in companies throughout the whole analysed period after treatment.  
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1. Introduction  
Addressing unemployment is a universal issue for governments in both developing and developed 
countries, with a number of programs and approaches to programs’ design being used, reviewed, 
started and gotten rid of each year. With the main goals of programs for unemployed including 
entering employment, increasing employability and help in finding suitable employment (as stated 
e.g. in OECD’s ALMP objectives), the most important question for the authorities is effectiveness 
of the measures in use. Governments spend considerable sums of money on these measures: in 
2017 only, OECD countries have spent 0.52% of GDP on active labor market policies; in Estonia 
this indicator equalled 0.42%. Passive measures such as benefits and compensations comprised 
another 0.68% of GDP in OECD, and 0.32% in Estonia.  
Both active and passive labor market policies are present in the arsenal of 21st century 
governments, with the latter referring to assistance in unemployment phase rather than help in 
jumping back into the labor market. In contrast, the active measures typically aim to increase 
human capital of jobseekers (training), boost the effectiveness of this process (job search 
assistance), incentivize employment or directly create it. Incentivising and training are two policies 
of particular interest – while they may have sizable negative returns in the short run, their effects 
are, at least in theory, meant to persist, creating better-educated and more experienced workforce.  
The volume of comprehensive quantitative studies on ALMP has exploded in the recent decades 
(see e.g. LaLonde 2003 and Card et al. 2017 for overviews), which allowed to generalize the impact 
of most of the programs in use. This is especially true for the “classic” programs aimed at the 
unemployed who want to enter or re-enter dependent employment. Card et al. (2017) summary of 
200 papers concludes that the programs of job search assistance have similar effects on 
employment both in the short (<1 year after treatment) and medium-to-long term, while private 
sector employment and training are significantly effective in medium and long run but often have 
insignificant or low significant treatment effects in the short run. Direct public sector employment 
is largely ineffective or even has a negative impact on the jobseekers across all intervals. Moreover, 
treatment effects differ across groups of participants, with females, average-aged participants and 
those who have been unemployed for a long time benefiting relatively more.  
The focus of this study is business start-up subsidy program for unemployed in Estonia. This 
program provides funding for the unemployed who meet program criteria in a form of one-time 
payment. Upon receiving the lump-sum money, the participant is obliged to start a company or 
running business as self-employed within the next six months and maintain business activities for 
at least a year; if these requirements are not met, the recipient must return the subsidy in full. In 
contrast to other labor market programs, business subsidy provides an opportunity for the 
unemployed to re-enter labor market in a non-dependent form of employment, thus distinguishing 
the participants from non-participants in a number of dimensions.  
Business subsidy falls into the “work first” category in Card et al. (2017) terms, i.e. the program 
goal is to enforce employment right away, in contrast to the raising of human capital. In this 
regard one would expect rather modest positive results, if any, in the short run and possible 
negative or statistically insignificant results in the medium-to-long run. However, most of 
existing articles on start-up subsidy policies conclude with significant positive effect of the 
program in terms of labor market prospects, business survival and, to some extent, income. At 
the same time, the success of business and entrepreneurial gains has shown to be less promising. 
The empirics consistently shows that the grant receivers differ greatly from their counterparts 
and, though to a lesser extent, from one another.  
In contrast to other labor market policies, research on business subsidy impact remains rather 
scarce, with an exception of Germany where the issue has been analyzed from several angles. In 
other countries, however, there exist only singular studies, if any. The paper on Estonian start-up 
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grant was written based on a rather small data sample (roughly 1000 program participants) and 
lacks supplementary analysis such as robustness check and testing alternative model specifications.  
Current Thesis contributes both to the overall literature on business subsidy ALMP and to the 
research on Estonia in several ways. First, it adds to the study by Estonian Unemployment 
Insurance Fund (EUIF) from 2014 (Vilsaar et al., 2014) by analyzing a later cohort of program 
participants. Second, the data is available for a quite long time span of a minimum of 24 months 
before and up to 60 months after subsidy. Finally, various matching variations are performed, 
including the one used in 2014 paper, and the model sensitivity is checked in contrast to the 
abovementioned paper. This allows to compare the results and extend the previous research on 
Estonia. 
Importantly, there exist substantial data limitations discussed in the sections below. Apart from 
the lack of some data on covariates which EUIF study has used, the outcome data is restricted to 
the income from tax declarations (thus not including dividends and the income of individuals 
registered as self-employed persons), and the data linking the program participants to the 
information on the firms they created is lacking.  
The effects are estimated by regressing the income outcomes on a list of available covariates and 
the treatment factor. The subsidy recipients are matched to the potentially comparable non-
recipients among the unemployed using propensity score matching and the nearest-neighbor 
algorithm. The proxy for survival rates is the treated individuals being registered as managers, 
board members, self-employed persons or on other high-ranking positions in companies.  
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2. Previous Studies 
 
2.1. Business Subsidy for the Unemployed 
Start-up subsidy as a way out of unemployment is present in the list of active labor market policies 
(ALMP) of developed countries continuously since the 1980-s. Comprehensive research on its 
effectiveness, however, emerged rather recently (O’Leary, 1999; Pfeiffer & Reize, 1998) and by 
now the area remains understudied compared to the other LMP. The most studied is German 
policy, with a series of papers such as (Baumgartner & Caliendo, 2008) and its further extensions, 
alongside individual papers on Finland (Tokila, 2009), Sweden (Behrenz et al., 2016), Romania 
(Rodrıguez-Planas and Jacob, 2010), Poland and Hungary (O’Leary, 1999) and some other. Among 
these the two distinct directions are comparison of subsidized start-ups with regular ones and 
contrasting participants of business subsidy program with other unemployed individuals. The 
observation longitude in these papers varies from 1.5 to 5 years, with the only exception of Tokila 
(2009) whose dataset allows to track the performance of businesses for a maximum of 14 years 
after start-up.  
Both the empirical literature and common reasoning allow to difference the unemployed 
individuals who apply for business subsidy both from other unemployed and from other 
entrepreneurs. For instance, one goal of start-up subsidy for the unemployed is to correct for 
possible disadvantages faced by subpopulation. Apart from credit constraints (see e.g. Schäfer et 
al., 2011), formerly unemployed businessmen are also characterized by less prior experience of 
self-employment than non-subsidized entrepreneurs, having a higher level of education in the firm-
specific field and a lower general one. Moreover, industry-specific knowledge and experience, 
assets and managerial experience were found to be strongly associated with business survival for 
subsidy receivers when, in contrast, regular start-ups’ survival correlated greatly with human and 
social capital and organizational ecology (Tokila 2009).  
Majority of authors emphasize the significance of intergenerational transmission, i.e. the ALMP 
participant’s parents being self-employed or running a firm at some point of their life. Other 
common distinctions include gender, region, industry of firm operation, experience and education.  
Disadvantages faced by the target group may put a barrier for their employment prospects and 
potential business success; for instance, higher-educated unemployed with considerable amount 
of experience may struggle less to get back into the labor market. In addition, females were shown 
to have higher preference towards flexible working schedule and responsiveness to childcare 
policies (see e.g. Lefebvre and Merrigan, 2008); historical and socioeconomic differences within a 
country contribute to diversification as well (e.g. Caliendo and Künn, 2014, on East versus West 
Germany). On the other hand, some individual factors are not necessary to include since they are 
already captured in formal variables. As Caliendo, Künn and Weißenberger (2016) have shown, 
adding variables for the Big Five personality traits, risk aversion and locus of control does not 
contribute to the explanatory power of the end model.  
The survival rates of subsidized start-ups are rather high in general and in contrast to their non-
subsidized counterparts, especially during the first 1 to 2 years (Duhautois et al., 2015, Vilsaar et 
al., 2014, Caliendo et al., 2015), with some studies emphasizing the subsidized firms’ better survival 
for all analyzed intervals (Tokila, 2009). However, the estimations of other business success 
dimensions for ALMP participants are, predictably, more conservative. Caliendo, Hogenacker, 
Künn and Wießner (2015) show that German subsidized start-ups lag behind the regular ones in 
business development and innovation.  
However, the first and foremost ALMP agenda is to facilitate re-entering employment. Compared 
to other unemployed, the participants in start-up subsidy program consistently show better results 
in terms of employment prospects. With an exception of study on Estonia partly reporting 
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statistically insignificant results1, the empirics concludes unambiguously that the treated have way 
higher probability of being in non-subsidized employment. Meanwhile, the program impact on 
income is more modest, with most papers concluding with slight positive statistically significant 
results in contrast to other unemployed2, and the firm studies showing lower income of the treated 
group.  
There remains one more problem to evaluating the effect of business subsidy on formerly 
unemployed. While participants differ from other population groups substantially, heterogeneity 
within the group also naturally occurs, causing some to benefit from treatment more than others. 
As mentioned earlier, business subsidy LMP may be more beneficial for disadvantaged individuals 
who allegedly find it harder to find a place in the labor market or to start a business. This 
assumption is consistent with segmented labor markets theory, though human capital theory 
predicts experienced and skilled workers to be the prime benefactors. Segmented labor markets 
theory gives a two-sectoral perspective on labor markets. Here, in contrast to a primary labor 
market with highly productive jobs and corresponding benefits, secondary sector is a place where 
less productive, more ‘traditional’ labor activities take place. The problem of unemployment thus 
may be related to the structure of employment, where relative prevalence of low-productive jobs 
displaces some individuals. Self-employment thus may be seen as a necessity for the people who 
would otherwise rather work a regular salary job. Human capital theory, on the other hand, 
suggests that better educated businessmen with prior experience have more chances of survival 
and maintained (self-)employment. 
Indeed, results point to either direction depending on the start-up subsidy program (as in Germany 
and Romania, where two separate programs coexisted), outcome and heterogeneity source 
considered. Within the same business subsidy program, low education level is associated with 
larger effect on the labor market outcome; at the same time, the effect on income is higher for the 
better educated (Caliendo and Künn, 2011; Behrenz et al., 2016). German nationals rather 
surprizingly benefit (also from both German LMP) more than non-Germans (Caliendo and Künn, 
2011). Depending on the program, results differ for age groups, education and skill level, and also 
for regions with different economy characteristics such as unemployment rate and GDP per capita 
(Rodrıguez-Planas and Jacob, 2010; Caliendo and Künn, 2014; 2015).  
Finally, a few studies highlight the possibility of dead weight presence, though its identification is 
a nontrivial task. Deadweight effect in terms of economic policy means that the outcome would 
be the same without treatment and is considered in O’Leary (1999) and Caliendo et al. (2015). The 
former claims that selection mechanism of control group and including substantial number of 
covariates eliminates deadweight loss and thus does not test the dead weight assumption directly. 
The latter set two outcomes to test: labor market status and business success, asking participants 
whether the program had any effect on these during the follow-up interview. Almost half of 
respondents stated they would start a business anyway, with some 23 per cent admitting they 
registered as unemployed specifically to receive the start-up subsidy. At the same time, though, 
roughly half of these individuals said that the subsidy was highly important for the firm survival 
during the period of its reception, which means that deadweight effect is in fact lower.  
Somewhat related is cost-benefit analysis in Caliendo and Steiner (2007) which concludes that the 
program effect is positive at least from the point of its direct costs and direct benefits for one of 
the two German programs. Vilsaar et al. (2014) included some indirect effects in their analysis as 
well, namely – management and employees’ wages and value added, and found that the benefits 
exceed the costs at the third year after start-up. Still, this perspective on efficiency is rather 
understudied, even though it highlights some significant flaws potentially existing in the business 
 
1 Their statistically significant results were positive for overall employment. 
2 Vilsaar et al. (2014) find treatment effect on income to be negative on the second year after receiving the subsidy. 
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subsidy policy. The question is not directly addressed in this Thesis, but it should be considered in 
further research on the topic.  
 
2.2. Estonia 
Business subsidy for the unemployed individuals in Estonia is granted for founding a new company 
or starting business activity as a self-employed person. A few requirements must be met in order 
to receive the grant. First, the applicant must have completed a business training or have either 
vocational education in economic field or prior experience of running a business. Second, the 
unemployed individual or the non-working job seeker of retirement age must present a business 
plan in the application. The maximum aid is 4,474 euros, and the sum may be withdrawn if 
economic activity is not started within six months upon receiving it.  
Since 2009, from 1.6 (2013) and up to 2 million euros (2017) was spent each year on this ALMP 
in Estonia. At least four hundred Estonians participated each given year, with females comprising 
more than a half of these cases in each of the latter years.3 
A 2014 study of Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund (Vilsaar et al., 2014) covers 2009-2011 
subsidy applicants, with slightly over 1,000 recipients and 10,427 control individuals. The results 
of treatment effect estimation are ambiguous: some are positive or statistically insignificant; some 
are even negative. The latter is true, for example, for paid employment after roughly 1.5 years after 
treatment. However, this measure excludes the members of company management or supervisory 
board who receive remuneration for their work; after including those in estimation the results after 
1.5 years since treatment become statistically insignificant. This may be a sign of data limitations: 
in each case, treated are matched with the controls who registered in the same month, so the 
number of observations diminishes over periods.  
Interestingly, the effect of ALMP on income does not show statistically significant positive results 
at all in EUIF study, in contrast to other papers on the topic reporting slight but positive and 
significant effect of treatment. Even though business survival rates are high among Estonian 
participants, their earnings were found to be either no different or even lower than those of non-
participants.  
Finally, there is a data limitation in EUIF article which somewhat reflects current Thesis issue: that 
is, the variables available on the treated and control individuals may not be enough to construct 
an adequate control group given the conditional independence assumption.  
 
  
 
3 2011 to 2018.  
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3. Methodology 
Given that the individuals in both groups have the same chance to be selected into treatment, 
differences in their outcomes (or lack thereof) provide useful insights from economic policy 
perspectives. Randomization, however, is rarely a property of real-life experiments, with selection 
of individuals with particular characteristics into treatment happening due to treatment specifics 
or restrictions on entering. The issue has been addressed by researchers systematically at least since 
the 1970’s, with growing complexity of methodology for making participants and non-participants 
comparable. This section will discuss a few common-use methods and the tools which recently 
became available for causal inference and related analyses and talk through the research methods 
of this thesis. 
 
3.1. Causal Inference 
Despite the existence of a number of other approaches, such as including covariates directly in 
regression, using instrumental variables or synthetic control, matching individuals by their 
propensity scores is arguably the most common in economic literature. The method is based on 
gathering the information about the differences between treated and controls into a single indicator 
of probability to be treated, which is later used in estimating treatment effect (Imbens, 2000). The 
basic idea is to make it possible to compare the outcomes of treated individuals with the outcomes 
of the non-treated who are the most akin to them. As argued in e.g. Nihms (2010), this way of 
balancing is not only complementary to other approaches, but also has an advantage of highlighting 
the insufficient overlap between the compared groups. Moreover, performance diagnostics is 
easier for methods involving matching, in contrast to selection and regression models.  
The obtained propensity score may be further used in several ways for treatment effect estimation. 
Direct matching (such as nearest neighbor or radius matching) compares each treated directly with 
one or several close control individuals, averaging the result afterwards. A potential drawback of 
such methods is that part of data may remain unused, even if the discarded observations are quite 
close in their propensity scores to the treated. Subclassification and weighing, in contrast, use all 
the available data either by implementing propensity scores in weights or forming groups of similar 
individuals. Weighting may be done by directly using inverse propensity scores in treatment effect 
estimation (inverse probability of treatment weighting) or averaging over a number of controls for 
each treated, with weights depending on the distance (Kernel matching). Weighting approaches, 
however, are highly sensitive to extreme weights (very close to 0 or 1) and model (mis-
)specification, since large weights increase variance of an estimate, which is only fine if the weights 
are correct. None of the available techniques is thus a priori superior to the others; even different 
specifications only allow a tradeoff between bias and variance in a model.  
This thesis uses several specifications of nearest-neighbor matching, including the one used in 
Vilsaar et al. (2014) (1:2 matching with replacement) and caliper matching. The choice of nearest-
neighbor method as the main propensity score-based one is driven by its comparability with the 
former EUIF study.  
 
3.2. Supplementary Analyses 
In the base potential outcome model (Roy 1951, Rubin 1974) treatment effect for binary treatment 
is formalized as follows: 𝐴𝑇𝐸 = 𝐸(𝑌1|𝑊 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌0|𝑊 = 0), where ATE is the average 
treatment effect, W is equal to 1 for treated individual and 0 otherwise, and Y is the outcome 
variable. The techniques that use matching rely on the assumption that after controlling for the 
confounding variables (i.e. the factors that influenced both assignment into treatment and 
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outcome) the outcomes are comparable. This premise, also called unconfoundedness or 
conditional independence assumption (CIA), is highly important for the result to be valid.  
CIA is a rather strong assumption: the ability to include all the background variables is limited 
when it comes to empirical matching, and direct testing for justification of the assumption is rather 
hard. Missing the relevant covariates is costly: while including unimportant variables in the 
propensity score (PS) estimation only leads to them having little weight or increases variance of 
estimators, not including relevant variables increases bias in research results. Since it is not always 
possible to account for all the factors of assignment into treatment and outcome, it is argued that 
the preference has to lie towards the variables affecting outcome (Brookhart et al. 2006). Including 
the unobserved data indicators in the PS model is one more way to deal with the issue. Another 
way is to use generalized boosted models (decision trees) which a priori do not require covariates 
to be fully observed. 
Supplementary analysis is essential for quantitative policy evaluation, providing justification for 
model choice and conclusions. One way to check robustness is to examine different model 
specifications before settling on the final model. Specifications may include modelling on different 
sets of variables, changing functional form and parameters, excluding certain observations or 
comparing the found outcome with an outcome of alternative estimators. Furthermore, Athey and 
Imbens (2015) suggest using subsampling the dataset for different model specifications and settling 
on an estimate for causal effect variable which is weighted average of the obtained estimates.  
Another direction of sensitivity analysis is obtaining ranges of estimates relying on assumptions of 
different weakness levels. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) offer to start from the most restrictive 
specification and gradually relax the main identifying assumptions such as CIA, analyzing the 
changes in estimates. One example is bounding approach (Rosenbaum, 2002) frequently used in 
policy evaluation papers; the key idea is to find the level of unobserved heterogeneity at which the 
results would no longer be robust. Imbens (2003) proposes a data-driven technique for finding 
correlations between treatment and outcome and the unobserved covariates. 
To sum up, supplementary analysis is a must for treatment effect estimation due to diversity of 
approaches and their effectiveness, and implications of Roy-Rubin model assumptions for 
matching procedures. Unfortunately, not all studies perform such analysis or report it – as e.g. in 
Rodrıguez-Planas and Jacob (2010) on Poland and Hungary ALMP and, more importantly, in 
Vilsaar et al. (2014) on Estonia.  
In this study, several specifications were used for each type of matching. In addition to matching 
the treated to a different number of controls, using different sets of covariates, and trying 
variations with and without replacement, an issue of treatment period was addressed from 
several angles. Treatment month and treatment quarter were used in the regressions on 
probability of treatment as well as the variables for exact matching. I also check the mean 
standardized differences after matching and test the results with a Rosenbaum bounds test. 
The reported treatment effects were estimated by running linear and general linear regressions 
and calculating robust standard errors for the “treated” variable estimate in the case of 
continuous outcome and marginal effects in the case of binary outcome.  
 
3.3. Treatment Effect Heterogeneity 
Non-random variability in treatment effect magnitude and direction is what we will call 
treatment effect heterogeneity. It seems reasonable to assume both theoretically and based on 
previous research that certain subgroups of start-up subsidy participants show results that are 
consistently different from the other.  
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The existing papers which addressed heterogeneity in business subsidy LMP effect used 
subgroup analysis based on pre-selected variables hypothesized to be heterogeneity drivers. 
Caliendo & Künn (2011, 2014), for instance, perform Kernel matching for subsamples formed 
for different levels of education, qualifications, nationality and age.  
In our case, unfortunately, the size of the dataset does not allow to get reliable results after 
splitting the data by a given variable. Thus, heterogeneity hypothesis was tested by adding 
interaction terms of treatment variable and the potential heterogeneity drivers such as gender, 
education level, mother tongue, region and previous job and unemployment experience to the 
outcome regression. The coefficient being statistically significant was regarded as an indicator of 
possible heterogeneity presence.  
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4. Data  
This Thesis focuses on comparing different groups of unemployed individuals in Estonia – those 
who used the business start-up subsidy and the ones who chose another labor market policy or 
none. The data is available for grant receivers in 2014 to 2018 and their counterparts, and includes 
background, previous and further employment and unemployment information. The income data 
is available for 2012-2019, which allows to take into account the information both before and after 
treatment.  
I use the data collected from several sources (Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund, Tax and 
Customs Board, Commercial Register) by Statistics Estonia, which, unfortunately, imposes 
limitations on the access to certain variables and hence may have influenced the quality of the 
analysis. For instance, the data on participation in a particular (incl. business) training by EUIF 
and on areas of education received by unemployed is not automatically present in Statistics Estonia 
database, and its inquiry from external sources is not feasible in the current project’s timelines. 
Ideally, filtering by several criteria would allow to select only eligible non-participants prior to the 
matching procedure, i.e. those who either have participated in business training; or have received 
vocational or higher education in economics; or had experience in managing a company or being 
self-employed. It is possible, however, to extend the analysis further with less time restrictions. In 
either case, larger number of observations than in the previous study (Vilsaar et al., 2014) together 
with a diversified methodological setup allow to assume that rather reliable conclusions can be 
drawn. Moreover, matching on the covariates helps overcome the mentioned limitation at least 
partly.  
Another drawback is that the available income data does not account for all the possible sources 
of income such as dividends. This limitation is addressed by using a dummy version of income in 
addition to the continuous one, since at least a minimum wage should be received in order to have 
health insurance in Estonia. In addition, the data on income of self-employed individuals is stored 
separately from the data on tax declarations which was available for the current research. However, 
only 47 out of 2138 treated registered as self-employed in the first months after subsidy. Still, 
separate analysis was conducted without self-employed individuals; the results are available in 
Appendix D.  
The outcome variables of interest are income and income being positive, the latter being a proxy 
for employment. Information on both is extracted from tax data, and the outcomes are estimated 
up to 60 months after treatment. The full list of covariates used for the matching and outcome 
regressions specifications include gender, education, region, number of previous unemployment 
spells, occupation at the last job, business experience, self-employment experience, age and age 
squared, duration of the  last employment, average income 1 year before treatment and treatment 
period. For program participants, treatment month or quarter were simply the month or quarter 
of receiving the subsidy. The non-participants were filtered out for whom unemployment has 
started before given month and ended after or has not ended. In addition, I dropped the controls 
whose unemployment started before the earliest unemployment start of the treated.  
The overall number of business subsidy recipients in the dataset is 2,148; these individuals are on 
average 38 years old, ranging from 20 to 69 at the time of start-up. Interestingly, more than half 
of them are female overall (57.7%) and in each individual month. 27.5% of grant receivers have 
already had some experience in business management, with 2% having run a business themselves 
or worked as self-employed.4  
The total number of potential controls in the pre-matching sample is 216,218. Each treatment 
month there are from 19 to 57 treated and from 1,864 to 5,152 potential controls, except for 
 
4 See Table 1 for more details. 
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January 2014. Due to the filtering choice, the duplicated observations were omitted so the first 
treatment period has more control observations. While this may be considered a drawback, such 
setting affects only a small portion of overall results both because of the large number of periods 
analyzed and the restrictions posed by nearest neighbor algorithm combined with exact matching 
on the treatment period.  
The pre-matching sample is rather unbalanced. The grant receivers are more often female (57.7 
compared to 50.8% in the control group), Estonian speakers (86.8 compared to 60%), having had 
business experience in general (27.5 compared to 15.4%) or having been self-employed (2 
compared to 1.1%) before registry in EUIF and more often registering as unemployed for the first 
time. In addition, there are relatively fewer program participants from North-East region and 
Harjumaa and relatively more from South-East and West. Much more (42.6 compared to 18.2%) 
treated individuals have received higher education; there are relatively more controls who have 
received only general secondary education (40 compared to 25%). In terms of propensity scores, 
a large portion of potential controls had a close to zero probability to be treated; however, there 
was enough overlap for the two groups to proceed with comparing the outcomes (See Figure 1 
and Table 1). 
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5. Results 
 
5.1. Matching Quality 
The matching results presented further are those of nearest neighbor matching with replacement, 
with a maximum of two controls per each treated and exact matching on the month of treatment. 
The reported results use the version with gender, mother tongue (binary – Estonian or not), 
business experience, region and education dummies, age, age squared, and average monthly 
income one year before treatment as predictors of the probability to be treated. Summary of pre- 
and afterbalance in Table 1 includes also self-employment experience and the first digits of ISCO-
08 (International Standard Classification of Occupations) codes from the last job before registry 
in EUIF. These dummies were used in intermediate analysis but not included in the final models 
since the data was missing for some of the treated individuals and the information is already 
captured to a great extent in variables such as business experience and average prior income.5 
Figure 1. Density of Propensity Scores Before and After Matching 
Panel (a). Before matching 
 
Panel (b). After matching 
 
 
5 See the descriptions of variables in Appendix A 
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Note 1: The matching results presented here are those of nearest neighbor 1:2 matching with replacement, 
with exact matching on treatment month. 
Note 2: Since the number of potential controls exceeded the number of treated substantially (99:1), the 
dataset was reweighted for the logit model which calculated fitted propensity scores.  
In contrast to a very unbalanced pre-matching sample, in the matched sample the standardized 
means did not differ by more than 0.07 for the variables used in the final analysis and did not differ 
by more than 0.1 for all the observed variables. However, the difference in the average prior 
income in fact increased after matching; this, in turn, may have influenced the reported treatment 
effects on the continuous outcome since the matched controls have been slightly higher earners 
on average than the treated. 
Table 1. Summary of Balance for the Main Variables Before and After Matching 
Variable Mean for 
treated 
Mean for 
controls 
before 
matching 
Mean for 
controls after 
matching 
Standard 
deviation for 
treated 
Standardized 
mean 
difference 
before 
matching 
Standardized 
mean 
difference 
after 
matching 
Male 0.4228 0.4917 0.4270 0.4941 -0.1393 -0.0085 
Mother tongue - Estonian 0.8676 0.6008 0.8782 0.3389 0.7871 -0.0311 
Number of previous 
unemployment spells 0.0019 0.3259 0.0023 0.0432 -7.4972 -0.0108 
Business experience 0.2746 0.1540 0.2928 0.4463 0.2702 -0.0409 
Self-employment experience 0.0206 0.0111 0.0210 0.1420 0.0664 -0.0033 
Age  37.280 38.998 37.300 9.8611 -0.1743 -0.0021 
Capital  0.3489 0.3745 0.3529 0.4767 -0.0537 -0.0083 
West 0.1127 0.0841 0.1258 0.3163 0.0906 -0.0414 
Center  0.0907 0.0920 0.0858 0.2873 -0.0043 0.0171 
North-East 0.0510 0.1522 0.0507 0.2200 -0.4600 0.0011 
South-East 0.3396 0.2322 0.3319 0.4736 0.2268 0.0163 
ISCO - 1 (last employment) 0.1618 0.0673 0.1300 0.3692 0.2584 0.0887 
ISCO - 2 (last employment) 0.1338 0.0549 0.1085 0.3404 0.2316 0.0742 
ISCO -3 (last employment) 0.1370 0.0762 0.1246 0.3439 0.1769 0.0360 
ISCO - 4 (last employment) 0.0543 0.0502 0.0447 0.2265 0.0179 0.0423 
ISCO - 5 (last employment) 0.1123 0.1302 0.1132 0.3157 -0.0569 -0.0030 
ISCO - 6 (last employment) 0.0098 0.0128 0.0115 0.0986 -0.0303 -0.0166 
ISCO - 7 (last employment) 0.1146 0.1370 0.0847 0.3186 -0.0702 0.0940 
ISCO - 8 (last employment) 0.0332 0.0832 0.0522 0.1792 -0.2791 -0.1057 
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Education secondary general 0.2507 0.4055 0.2493 0.4335 -0.3572 0.0032 
Education professional 0.1618 0.1586 0.1492 0.3683 0.0088 0.0343 
Education vocational 0.1422 0.2040 0.1562 0.3493 -0.1769 -0.0402 
Education higher 0.4261 0.1817 0.4298 0.4946 0.4941 -0.0076 
Average income 1 year before 
treatment 335.81 352.29 379.25 626.04 -0.0263 -0.0694 
Propensity score 0.6576 0.3385 0.6576 0.1861 1.7141 0.0001 
Note: Standardized mean difference in the difference in means for treated and controls adjusted for the 
standard deviation for treated, i.e. 
𝜇𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑−𝜇𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
𝜎𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑
. 
In addition, the analysis in highly sensitive to the bias coming from the departure from random 
assignment into treatment. Table 2 shows the results’ sensitivity based on the Rosenbaum test 
which relies on the assumption that there may exist an unobserved covariate which influenced the 
treatment assignment and that the treated and controls might thus be the same in terms of 
observed covariates while their true propensity scores are in fact different. The Rosenbaum (2002) 
approach seeks to find a threshold of the relationship between an unobserved covariate and the 
exposure which would make the treatment effect estimate insignificant.  
Table 2. Rosenbaum Bounds Test Results for Outcomes 1 Year After Treatment 
Gamma 
Binary outcome (income positive) Continuous outcome (income) 
Bounds for McNemar’s test 
statistic 
Bounds for Hodges-Lehmann 
point estimate 
Bounds for Wilcoxon signed rank 
p-value 
Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound 
1.0 0 0.00000 -49.99 -49.990000 0.0116 0.0116 
1.1 0 0.00044 -50.09 0.010068 0.0001 0.2485 
1.2 0 0.02567 -50.09 0.010068 0.0000 0.7800 
1.3 0 0.24720 -50.09 15.010000 0.0000 0.9825 
1.4 0 0.68585 -72.49 37.510000 0.0000 0.9996 
1.5 0 0.94142 -100.09 56.310000 0.0000 1.0000 
1.6 0 0.99499 -125.09 77.010000 0.0000 1.0000 
1.7 0 0.99978 -146.79 98.010000 0.0000 1.0000 
1.8 0 0.99999 -170.09 119.41000 0.0000 1.0000 
1.9 0 1.00000 -189.29 137.81000 0.0000 1.0000 
2.0 0 1.00000 -201.59 161.01000 0.0000 1.0000 
Notes: Gamma is the odds of differential assignment due to the unobserved factors. McNemar’s test 
statistic is a simple difference between the number of treated and the number of those treated who had 
outcome 1 with a χ-squared distribution. Hodges-Lehmann point estimate may be interpreted as the 
median difference in the outcomes of treated and controls. The estimates and p-values in bounds test 
results may differ from those in the matching analysis. 
The estimates are sensitive to a bias that would increase the odds of treatment even by 10% in the 
case of income and by 30% in the case of income dummy. I.e., even rather small variation in the 
input would change the inference conclusions. Moreover, the outcome data is available for the 
whole population of treated and controls only up to 12 months after treatment (since the latest 
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available data on income is for December 2019 and the latest available data on business subsidy is 
for December 2018), and the number of observations reduces after this period. The estimation 
results must thus be met with cautiousness.  
 
5.2. Estimation Results 
The effect of treatment on earnings has been negative in all matching variations. Picture 2 shows 
that throughout almost the whole observed time after treatment the average income of the treated 
was significantly lower than that of the controls, reaching a bit under 200-euro difference. Even in 
the more ambiguous results from other variations, the number of consequent months with 
significant negative treatment effect values was over 30 (from ca 5th to 40th month after treatment).  
Figure 2. Treatment Effect  
Panel (a) Income 
 
Panel (b) Income Being Positive 
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Notes: Treatment effect on Panel (a) is the coefficient of variable “treated” in the outcome regression. On 
Panel (b) y-axis is the marginal effect of treatment dummy on the outcome dummy. The range is 
±1.96SE, robust errors. 
However, as pointed out earlier, the income data does not capture all the possible sources of 
income. The effect on income being positive has shown to be more ambiguous – positive 
throughout the first year after subsidy and negative or insignificant afterwards. The positive 
treatment effect during the first year should not come as a surprise, though, since one of the EUIF 
demands is to maintain business activities for at least a year after the subsidy has been received. 
The results on Figure 2 are the coefficients (in the case of income) and marginal effects (in the 
case of income dummy) of the treatment variable. The heterogeneity hypothesis was tested by 
including an interaction term into the joint outcome regressions. Even though several coefficients 
of the interaction terms were significant for the income, it may be possible that these results were 
affected by the exclusivity of this outcome variable. Results in Table 3 suggest that the grant 
program may have been more useful to the individuals with secondary education, those without a 
degree and those without business experience. 
As for the binary outcome, only the treated males had significantly higher chance to have a positive 
gross wage 24 months after treatment; living in Tallinn, conversely, reduced the effect of treatment. 
However, as seen in Table 3, unemployed males in general had lower probability to have positive 
earnings and those residing in capital may have had higher (though not significant statistically) 
probability to receive positive earnings. More importantly, the marginal effect of treatment on 
dummy variable 24 months after treatment is not statistically significant (see Appendix B).  
Table 3. Summary Statistics for the Outcome Models, 24 months after treatment 
                   Dependent Variable 
 Income positive 
logistic 
Income 
OLS 
 base interactions base interactions 
Treated -0.126** 
(0.051) 
-0.230*** 
(0.068) 
-0.038 
(0.063) 
-155.086*** 
(15.126) 
-93.407*** 
(14.953) 
-175.89*** 
(18.473) 
-128.73*** 
(15.966) 
Male -0.101* 
(0.057) 
-0.263*** 
(0.074) 
-0.097* 
(0.057) 
49.070*** 
(15.122) 
47.082*** 
(15.041) 
49.206*** 
(15.118) 
50.110*** 
(15.125) 
Mother tongue 
Estonian   0.227** (0.093) 
0.222** 
(0.093) 
0.229** 
(0.093) 
73.900*** 
(23.466) 
75.418*** 
(23.445) 
74.262*** 
(23.425) 
74.451*** 
(23.449) 
Number of previous 
unemployment spells 0.414 (0.486) 
0.426 
(0.489) 
0.415 
(0.488) 
-4.471 
(87.726) 
-9.463 
(86.610) 
-2.444 
(86.841) 
-10.685 
(86.985) 
Business experience 0.003 
(0.063) 
-0.003 
(0.063) 
0.003 
(0.63) 
50.188*** 
(17.999) 
47.107*** 
(17.983) 
48.351*** 
(17.976) 
112.769*** 
(28.289) 
Age  0.046** 
(0.020) 
0.047** 
(0.020) 
0.047** 
(0.020) 
8.820* 
(5.036) 
8.231 
(5.022) 
8.589* 
(5.033) 
8.553* 
(5.041) 
Age-squared 0.001** 
(0.0003) 
-0.001** 
(0.0003) 
-0.001** 
(0.0003) 
-0.137** 
(0.063) 
-0.128* 
(0.063) 
-0.134** 
(0.063) 
-0.132* 
(0.064) 
Capital 0.206 
(0.132) 
0.202 
(0.132) 
0.204 
(0.132) 
111.902*** 
(26.366) 
111.885*** 
(26.193) 
111.355*** 
(26.345) 
110.744*** 
(26.340) 
West -0.025 
(0.145) 
-0.031 
(0.145) 
-0.023 
(0.144) 
68.484** 
(29.375) 
70.314** 
(29.214) 
69.291** 
(29.341) 
68.014** 
(29.385) 
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Center 0.290* 
(0.150) 
0.288* 
(0.150) 
0.289* 
(0.150) 
31.413 
(28.550) 
33.049 
(28.303) 
32.387 
(28.499) 
29.944 
(28.477) 
North-East 0.044 
(0.181) 
0.037 
(0.181) 
0.045 
(0.181) 
45.741 
(38.531) 
50.542 
(38.296) 
46.212 
(38.427) 
44.551 
(38.550) 
South-East 0.063 
(0.130) 
0.057 
(0.130) 
0.239* 
(0.138) 
34.928 
(24.468) 
36.798 
(24.256) 
35.362 
(24.428) 
35.127 
(24.466) 
Education secondary 
general 1.017*** (0.266) 
1.010*** 
(0.265) 
1.027*** 
(0.266) 
96.754** 
(44.295) 
95.931** 
(44.110) 
38.863 
(46.869) 
95.604** 
(44.188) 
Education Vocational 1.037*** 
(0.269) 
1.026*** 
(0.269) 
1.046*** 
(0.270) 
116.494*** 
(45.166) 
117.932** 
(44.970) 
115.231** 
(45.215) 
114.411** 
(45.066) 
Education professional 1.054*** 
(0.271) 
1.047*** 
(0.270) 
1.065*** 
(0.271) 
146.118*** 
(45.464) 
144.883*** 
(45.300) 
145.194*** 
(45.510) 
141.804*** 
(45.442) 
Education higher 1.233*** 
(0.266) 
1.229*** 
(0.266) 
1.245*** 
(0.267) 
259.453*** 
(46.443) 
353.752*** 
(50.379) 
259.495*** 
(46.481) 
256.136*** 
(46.339) 
Average income 1 year 
before treatment 0.002*** (0.0002) 
0.002*** 
(0.0002) 
0.002*** 
(0.0002) 
0.440*** 
(0.051) 
0.440*** 
(0.051) 
0.440*** 
(0.051) 
0.440*** 
(0.051) 
Treated::Male  0.244** (0.103)      
Treated::Capital   -0.261** (0.107)     
Treated::Education 
higher     -141.50*** (31.002)   
Treated::Education 
secondary general      84.790*** (28.333)  
Treated::Business 
experience       -94.999*** (36.227) 
Constant  -2.534*** 
(0.466) 
-2.470*** 
(0.466) 
-2.623*** 
(0.468)  
-99.995 
(107.688) 
-47.583 
(107.745) 
-78.513 
(106.965) 
Observations  6,824 6,824 6,824 6,824 6,824 6,824 6,824 
R2    0.238 0.241 0.239 0.239 
Adjusted R2    0.237 0.239 0.237 0.237 
Log Likelihood -2,197.282 -2,196.553 -2,196.614     
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,430.563 4,431.105 4,431.228     
Residual Std. Error    501.726 (df = 6806) 
500.947 (df 
= 6805) 
501.542 (df 
= 6805) 
501.464 (df 
= 6805) 
F Statistic    
125.337*** 
(df = 17; 
6806) 
119.974*** 
(df = 18; 
6805) 
118.793*** 
(df = 18; 
6805) 
118.948*** 
(df = 18; 
6805) 
Note 1: Column 1 reports the coefficients from the binary outcome regression, not the marginal effects. 
See marginal effects in Appendix B. 
Note 2: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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6. Discussion 
The results in this analysis indicate that the business subsidy had a positive effect on the probability 
to receive positive income during the first year and insignificant or negative effect afterwards; the 
effect on income has been strictly negative already after several months.  
Given the findings in the previous papers on non-Estonian business subsidy for the unemployed 
(e.g. Caliendo and Künn, 2011; Behrenz et al., 2016), the results seem rather surprising. One 
possible explanation for the subsidy effect being negative or not significant is that the estimation 
(2014-2019) takes place during the economic growth period, so that it was relatively easy to re-
enter employment without taking a business risk. If it is the case, the treatment effect is negative 
because the income of the controls (and the fraction of controls with positive income) grew faster.  
Figure 3. Outcomes in the Matched Sample (by treatment year) 
Panel (a) Mean Income in the Matched Sample 
 
Panel (b). Fraction of Positive Income in the Matched Sample 
 
Note: Quarterly data is available in Appendix C. 
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Indeed, there is no sharp decline in the values of the outcome variables for the treated (Figure 3). 
Instead, the controls have slightly higher growing probability of receiving earnings in some 
cohorts. Depending on the treatment period, however, the fraction of income being positive may 
have grown faster for the grant receivers (2017-2018). Still, the average prior income values turned 
out rather unbalanced for the treated and control group; moreover, the patterns of income change 
differ for program participants and non-participants substantially. Finally, there is a possibility of 
other income sources which were not accounted for, such as unemployment insurance benefits, 
income of those registered as self-employed and dividends. However, the analysis using a 
constrained dataset yielded similar results (see Appendix D).  
Another possible explanation is that the previously unemployed businessmen differ from the rest 
(Tokila, 2009; Caliendo et al., 2015). It may be the case that the business environment during the 
studied period was highly competitive, and the subsidy participants were unable to cope with it 
given their knowledge, skills, experience and other constraints and hence ended up stopping their 
business activities or stopped gaining profits from them. The treated do seem to experience a slight 
decline in income around 2 years after treatment in most cases, while the controls who are assumed 
to work regular jobs experience a boost or at least maintain the same level of income.  
Finally, Vilsaar et al. (2014) also report negative effect of the subsidy on income. In line with Card 
et al. (2017) arguments, the “work first” types of ALMP may indeed have zero or negative effect 
on participants in the medium and long term. 
Importantly, due to the data limitations it is still not possible to firmly state that the actual effect 
was negative. Even if the effect is indeed negative for the receivers’ income, the actual ALMP 
effect is more complicated, and the societal benefits from the concomitant job creation may have 
been high enough for the overall effect to be positive. Though the data on the businesses created 
and their employees was not available in the scope of this thesis, I used the data on the high-up 
positions held in companies to construct survival rates.  
Figure 4. Business Survival Rates (by treatment year) 
 
Note 1: Fraction of self-employed (those registered as self-employed, board members, managers and other 
– see the full list in Appendix A) in the group of treated, by month after treatment. 
Note 2: Most of the treated (around 95%) were registered as managers or board members. Self-employed 
comprised up to 5% of treated.  
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Clearly, the treated have remained employed long after receiving the subsidy. Though the rates 
differ depending on the year of grant, the receivers usually started business activities within the 
first year and remained involved in them (or, at the very least, in business activities in other 
companies) for the whole observed period. The results on Figure 4 may hint on the restrictions 
posed by the available income data for this project. 
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Appendix A: Description of the Used Variables  
Variable Definition 
Treated 1 if treated 
Male Gender, 1 if male 
Mother tongue  1 if Estonian 
Number of previous unemployment spells Number of registrations in EUIF before the last 
one 
Business experience Having held certain positions in a company before 
the last registration in EUIF: representative person; 
entitled representative person; entrepreneur; 
authorized representative limited partner, self-
employed; fund manager; management board 
member; board member; representative of the 
company; manager; head of branch 
Self-employment experience Having held certain positions in a company before 
the last registration in EUIF: self-employed; 
entrepreneur 
ISCO-08 (last employment) Occupation code for the last job before registry in 
EUIF. International Standard Classification of 
Occupations  
Age Age at the time of registry in EUIF 
Education ISCED 2011 (International Standard Classification 
of Education) codes at the time of registration in 
EUIF. Early childhood and primary education not 
included 
Region Administrative regions. “Capital” for Harju county 
/ Northern Estonia 
Average prior income Mean monthly gross income from tax declarations 
for 12 months before treatment 
Income Gross income from tax declarations 
Income being positive 1 if gross income from tax declarations was 
positive in a given mont 
Survival rates Fraction of treated who held certain positions in a 
company after treatment: self-employed, 
entrepreneur, manager, board member, 
management board member; representative of the 
company; partner; head of brach 
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Appendix B: Marginal Effects on Income Dummy  
Variable 1 year after treatment 2 years after treatment 
Treated -0.0362*** (0.0123) 
-0.0231* 
(0.0140) 
Male  -0.0183 (0.0124) 
-0.0274** 
(0.0140) 
Mother tongue - Estonian 0.0570*** (0.0199) 
0.0430* 
(0.0225) 
Number of previous unemployment 
spells 
0.0034 
(0.1112) 
0.0611* 
(0.1244) 
Business experience 0.0000 (0.0137) 
0.0070 
(0.0156) 
Age  0.0138*** (0.0045) 
0.0092* 
(0.0050) 
Age squared -0.0002*** (0.0001) 
-0.0001* 
(0.0001) 
Capital 0.0363 (0.0273) 
0.0120 
(0.0311) 
West  0.0148 (0.0304) 
-0.0232* 
(0.0346) 
Center  0.0644** (0.0318) 
0.0489 
(0.0361) 
North-East 0.0012 (0.0392) 
0.0003 
(0.0441) 
South-East 0.0116 (0.0270) 
-0.0166 
(0.0307) 
Education secondary general 0.2065*** (0.0477) 
0.2079*** 
(0.0604) 
Education professional 0.2226*** (0.0478) 
0.2253*** 
(0.0615) 
Education vocational 0.2143*** (0.0478) 
0.2116*** 
(0.0614) 
Education higher 0.2616*** (0.0466) 
0.2583*** 
(0.0603) 
Average income 1 year before treatment 0.0002*** (0.0000) 
0.0003*** 
(0.0000) 
Notes: Robust standard errors. Significance: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Appendix C: Outcomes in the Matched Sample (by treatment quarter)  
(a) Mean Income in the Matched Sample 
 
(b) Fraction of Positive Income in the Matched Sample 
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Appendix D: Results from Constrained Dataset  
(a) Treatment Effects on Income  
 
(b) Marginal Effects of Treatment on Income Being Positive 
 
Notes: The results excluding the individuals who were registered as self-employed in the first year after 
treatment. The treatment effects on income in this variation are in fact slightly higher in absolute terms 
than those reported in Figure 2. 
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